

SOMEWHERE IN THE SKIES



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1
00:00:05,090 --> 00:00:01,550

[Music]

2
00:00:10,009 --> 00:00:07,309

there's a system called the space fence

3
00:00:12,350 --> 00:00:10,019

which is unique to the United States and

4
00:00:13,910 --> 00:00:12,360

we have two locations one in the

5
00:00:16,310 --> 00:00:13,920

northern one in the southern hemisphere

6
00:00:19,250 --> 00:00:16,320

where this system operates and

7
00:00:21,590 --> 00:00:19,260

essentially anything in orbit that

8
00:00:25,189 --> 00:00:21,600

passes through the beams of this system

9
00:00:28,730 --> 00:00:25,199

is going to be cataloged in high detail

10
00:00:33,069 --> 00:00:28,740

and high resolution incredibly powerful

11
00:00:35,990 --> 00:00:33,079

system in addition we have these

12
00:00:37,670 --> 00:00:36,000

solid-state phased array Radars that are

13
00:00:38,630 --> 00:00:37,680

the most powerful emitters on the planet

14

00:00:41,450 --> 00:00:38,640

Earth

15

00:00:43,729 --> 00:00:41,460

that are in locations around the

16

00:00:45,889 --> 00:00:43,739

periphery of North America

17

00:00:48,830 --> 00:00:45,899

to guard us against ICBM and cruise

18

00:00:51,709 --> 00:00:48,840

missile attacks and and bomber attacks

19

00:00:55,250 --> 00:00:51,719

from afar they can see in some cases

20

00:00:58,189 --> 00:00:55,260

objects potentially uh 20 000 miles away

21

00:01:01,189 --> 00:00:58,199

the size of a baseball so the taxpayers

22

00:01:03,950 --> 00:01:01,199

money has been invested uh extensively

23

00:01:06,490 --> 00:01:03,960

to provide these capabilities they're

24

00:01:11,810 --> 00:01:06,500

obviously collecting mountains of data

25

00:01:14,870 --> 00:01:11,820

every day 24 7 365 all year long and

26

00:01:17,149 --> 00:01:14,880

it's inconceivable that with all of that

27

00:01:19,910 --> 00:01:17,159

data they're not having any uh any

28

00:01:23,570 --> 00:01:19,920

incidents involving uh unknown aerial

29

00:01:24,710 --> 00:01:23,580

phenomenon and in essence look Chris is

30

00:01:26,570 --> 00:01:24,720

absolutely right

31

00:01:28,510 --> 00:01:26,580

um we spend billions of dollars on

32

00:01:31,670 --> 00:01:28,520

avoiding any type of strategic surprise

33

00:01:34,429 --> 00:01:31,680

from uh from an adversary and so what

34

00:01:36,289 --> 00:01:34,439

makes our capabilities so capable so

35

00:01:39,530 --> 00:01:36,299

effective is that we don't just rely on

36

00:01:42,109 --> 00:01:39,540

one system uh we imagine a uh imagine a

37

00:01:43,670 --> 00:01:42,119

cloth that has woven fibers uh they kind

38

00:01:45,830 --> 00:01:43,680

of go this way and then some go up and

39

00:01:47,510 --> 00:01:45,840

down and that's the strength that that's

40

00:01:50,330 --> 00:01:47,520

what provides a strength to the fabric

41

00:01:52,370 --> 00:01:50,340

and very much the same way when we are

42

00:01:53,630 --> 00:01:52,380

looking at having what we call for

43

00:01:55,370 --> 00:01:53,640

example

44

00:01:58,429 --> 00:01:55,380

um air domain awareness being being

45

00:02:00,410 --> 00:01:58,439

aware of what's actually in our skies we

46

00:02:03,289 --> 00:02:00,420

have all sorts of very capable systems

47

00:02:05,990 --> 00:02:03,299

from electro Optical hyperspectral to uh

48

00:02:07,969 --> 00:02:06,000

electromagnetic like radar and these are

49

00:02:10,729 --> 00:02:07,979

capabilities that exist not just on the

50

00:02:14,030 --> 00:02:10,739

ground but also at Sea also airborne and

51
00:02:16,369 --> 00:02:14,040
finally spaceborne and so when you when

52
00:02:19,369 --> 00:02:16,379
you have capabilities that are looking

53
00:02:21,530 --> 00:02:19,379
from the ground up and from the sea up

54
00:02:22,670 --> 00:02:21,540
and from the air across and from space

55
00:02:25,910 --> 00:02:22,680
down

56
00:02:29,150 --> 00:02:25,920
you get a much better comprehensive

57
00:02:32,690 --> 00:02:29,160
picture of what's going on and and that

58
00:02:35,270 --> 00:02:32,700
is the value of our of our intelligence

59
00:02:37,550 --> 00:02:35,280
assets because it's not just one system

60
00:02:39,770 --> 00:02:37,560
there are multiple systems that are

61
00:02:42,850 --> 00:02:39,780
designed in some cases some cases to

62
00:02:45,050 --> 00:02:42,860
work with each other in other cases

63
00:02:47,449 --> 00:02:45,060

integrating the systems can be a bit of

64

00:02:48,589 --> 00:02:47,459

a challenge but that therein lies the

65

00:02:51,530 --> 00:02:48,599

utility

66

00:02:54,350 --> 00:02:51,540

um as far as the Air Force kind of not

67

00:02:56,509 --> 00:02:54,360

playing much of a role in this if I may

68

00:02:58,190 --> 00:02:56,519

remind you and your audience just a few

69

00:02:59,869 --> 00:02:58,200

months ago the secretary of the Air

70

00:03:01,309 --> 00:02:59,879

Force said for the record look we know

71

00:03:03,949 --> 00:03:01,319

these things are out there we know

72

00:03:05,630 --> 00:03:03,959

they're real these things but since we

73

00:03:08,030 --> 00:03:05,640

don't know what they are it's not really

74

00:03:09,470 --> 00:03:08,040

a priority now think about that

75

00:03:11,210 --> 00:03:09,480

statement for just a minute I'm not

76

00:03:12,710 --> 00:03:11,220

trying to beat up on on secretary

77

00:03:15,830 --> 00:03:12,720

Kendall I'm just simply saying that

78

00:03:18,229 --> 00:03:15,840

that's like saying okay A a submarine

79

00:03:20,630 --> 00:03:18,239

pops out of the Potomac River outside of

80

00:03:22,369 --> 00:03:20,640

Washington DC and because we know it's

81

00:03:24,170 --> 00:03:22,379

not ours but because we don't know whose

82

00:03:25,850 --> 00:03:24,180

it is yeah we're not going to pay

83

00:03:27,589 --> 00:03:25,860

attention to it

84

00:03:29,390 --> 00:03:27,599

um that that really doesn't make much

85

00:03:32,030 --> 00:03:29,400

sense and especially when you're talking

86

00:03:33,649 --> 00:03:32,040

about controlled U.S airspace you know

87

00:03:35,630 --> 00:03:33,659

there are definitely some no-go fly

88

00:03:38,210 --> 00:03:35,640

zones that we have and we have them

89

00:03:41,089 --> 00:03:38,220

there too because of a result of of 9

90

00:03:43,910 --> 00:03:41,099

11. and so making sure that we can

91

00:03:46,789 --> 00:03:43,920

maintain error domain awareness is an

92

00:03:50,330 --> 00:03:46,799

imperative of this country good or for

93

00:03:52,809 --> 00:03:50,340

bad and yet we know as a matter of fact

94

00:03:54,949 --> 00:03:52,819

these things continue to to come in

95

00:03:56,210 --> 00:03:54,959

unimpeded into our controlled U.S

96

00:03:57,830 --> 00:03:56,220

airspace

97

00:04:00,050 --> 00:03:57,840

um and and they're displaying technology

98

00:04:02,690 --> 00:04:00,060

quite frankly that is rather perplexing

99

00:04:05,089 --> 00:04:02,700

it it's beyond anything that we have in

100

00:04:06,830 --> 00:04:05,099

our current inventory yeah to uh

101
00:04:09,410 --> 00:04:06,840
exemplify what Lou's talking about the

102
00:04:14,270 --> 00:04:09,420
U.S space surveillance system alone has

103
00:04:16,129 --> 00:04:14,280
29 distinct components in subsystems so

104
00:04:17,990 --> 00:04:16,139
you've got a ground-based optical

105
00:04:21,349 --> 00:04:18,000
Network that streams the world that's

106
00:04:22,909 --> 00:04:21,359
looking at the sky and comparing the

107
00:04:24,890 --> 00:04:22,919
movement against the stars of any

108
00:04:27,770 --> 00:04:24,900
anything that is reflecting light from

109
00:04:29,870 --> 00:04:27,780
the sun for example and then imagine 28

110
00:04:31,909 --> 00:04:29,880
other components including satellite

111
00:04:34,249 --> 00:04:31,919
systems and ground-based Radars and

112
00:04:37,730 --> 00:04:34,259
other things so it is quite an extensive

113
00:04:40,730 --> 00:04:37,740

mesh as Lou said but part of the reason

114

00:04:42,129 --> 00:04:40,740

that uh in addition to that that it

115

00:04:44,930 --> 00:04:42,139

seems so

116

00:04:47,390 --> 00:04:44,940

uh unconscionable to me that the Air

117

00:04:49,909 --> 00:04:47,400

Force was not um presenting or sharing

118

00:04:51,430 --> 00:04:49,919

any cases is some of this stuff is in

119

00:04:54,230 --> 00:04:51,440

the newspapers

120

00:04:56,270 --> 00:04:54,240

we've got Air Force interceptors taking

121

00:04:59,210 --> 00:04:56,280

off from from fighter squadrons in

122

00:05:01,670 --> 00:04:59,220

Oregon Chasing UFOs that commercial

123

00:05:03,650 --> 00:05:01,680

airline pilots are reporting to the FAA

124

00:05:05,749 --> 00:05:03,660

and the faa's got them on radar and

125

00:05:07,550 --> 00:05:05,759

we've got the the chatter from the

126

00:05:08,930 --> 00:05:07,560

pilots on radar the Air Force is

127

00:05:12,469 --> 00:05:08,940

acknowledging these planes were

128

00:05:14,689 --> 00:05:12,479

scrambled so how could they not list and

129

00:05:16,909 --> 00:05:14,699

identify those as is this is UAP

130

00:05:18,950 --> 00:05:16,919

incidents

131

00:05:20,450 --> 00:05:18,960

um so it rages not only from things that

132

00:05:21,590 --> 00:05:20,460

may be highly classified but things that

133

00:05:24,469 --> 00:05:21,600

are already very much in the public

134

00:05:27,409 --> 00:05:24,479

domain and it's very hard for me to

135

00:05:29,570 --> 00:05:27,419

understand and reconcile the congress's

136

00:05:31,670 --> 00:05:29,580

request for information and this seeming

137

00:05:33,950 --> 00:05:31,680

uh near complete dearth of information